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Trends in Communist Propaganda 7 May 75

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TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda

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These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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VIETNAM

The most notable feature of Vietnamese communist propaganda in the week following the "liberation" of South Vietnam is the absence of major authoritative statements or new policy directives. There has been no government statement issued, and the only party statement has been a "directive" from the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) Secretariat, dated the 5th and released on the 7th, which announced that the Political Bureau had decided that the victory should be celebrated throughout the "entire country" on a day which would be announced later. Both the delay in issuing statements consistent with the magnitude of the occasion and Hanoi's public comment on the military campaign leading up to the surrender of Saigon suggest the communists did not anticipate or prepare for achieving total control in the South this year. By contrast, in January 1973, following the signing of the Paris agreement, the media promptly publicized appeals from the DRV government and party and from the NFLSV and PRG acclaiming the achievement and setting forth future tasks.

Vietnamese comment on the landmark victory in the press and radio and in leaders' speeches at Hanoi's May Day celebrations has concentrated on rejoicing over the military achievements in the South, while avoiding discussion of future plans for the administration of South Vietnam and reunification with the North. Hanoi has generally attributed the victory to the "entire people and army of Vietnam" and to the leadership of the VWP. The PRG's role representing the South internationally has been confirmed in comment calling upon Thailand and other nations to return to the PRG aircraft and ships taken out of South Vietnam by members of the previous Saigon government and army. However, to date the NFLSV/PRG leaders have not made a public appearance, have released no statement on the victory, and they have not been portrayed in the media as assuming power in the South. The administration of Saigon has been taken over by a "military management committee" which has been issuing numerous communiques over Saigon radio, received the leadership of the former government in ceremonies on 4 May, and organized a mass meeting in Saigon on the 7th.

MILITARY COMMITTEE ADMINISTERS SAIGON, HOLDS PUBLIC MEETING

The communists moved swiftly to organize the newly conquered inhabitants of Saigon and adjoining Gia Dinh Province and inform them of new regulations and controls. Within the day following the

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the surrender of the capital on 30 April the Saigon radio began to carry a series of instructions in the form of communiquees and decisions from the Saigon "military management committee" explaining to the populace what was expected of them. The leading position of the military committee was also underlined by its role in receiving the members of the former Saigon government on 4 May and by the fact that it set up headquarters in the former presidential palace.

On 3 May other Vietnamese media joined with the Saigon radio in publicizing a namelist of the military management committee's 11 members, headed by Colonel General Tran Van Tra, who had led the PRG military delegation to the Joint Military Commission in Saigon in February and March 1973, following the signing of the Paris agreement. Tra was born in South Vietnam, but has been publicly identified as an alternate member of the VWP Central Committee. He was evidently elevated to his present rank of colonel general in April 1974, when Hanoi conferred its first known military promotions since 1961.*

SAIGON MEETING Saigon radio broadcast live Tran Van Tra's speech to the 7 May meeting in the Southern capital, held to publicly present the military management committee. Tra opened by extending greetings from the NFLSV Central Committee and the PRG--as well as the South Vietnam PLAF Command--but he otherwise did not mention the ostensible new government of South Vietnam. The failure of the communists thus far to surface a functioning government organization was underlined by Tra's repeated euphemistic references to the guiding role of the "revolution," including praise for the role of the "revolution" in the past struggle and the attribution of future policies to it as well. Thus, in offering reassurance to people who had been associated with the former government, he promised that "the revolution" was prepared to pardon "even those who in the past had committed crimes" if they would now "repent." (The "majority" of government employees,

* Tra's military rank was not indicated in the Liberation Radio report on his only known public appearance since early 1974. The 16 February 1975 report listed Tra among members of the South Vietnam PLAF Command who participated in a meeting in a "liberated area." There are now four North Vietnamese generals who have been publicly identified with the rank of colonel general--second only to the position of senior general, which is held by Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap and Chief of Staff Van Tien Dung. For further background, see the TRENDS of 18 September 1974, page 3; 7 August 1974, pages 22-25; and 1 May 1974, pages 2-3.

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according to Tra, were unwilling victims of the circumstances.) Tra also pledged that "the revolution" would always respect and protect the lives of foreigners who comply with the orders of the military committee.

Seeming to reflect an emerging Marxist organization of society, Tra hailed the actions of the "worker-labor class" in the days since the capital's "liberation" and asserted that the workers "are thus worthy of being the revolutionary vanguard class representing the bright future of our people." He added cryptically that "labor from now on is the measure of one's loyalty toward the country." Tra also outlined the duties of other elements, for example, calling upon the youth to be the "vanguard and the core in all revolutionary movements," urging "elders" to teach children and grandchildren to help the revolution, and assuring intellectuals they can "develop their talents in independence and freedom."

DRV MILITARY COMMENTATOR "CHIEN THANG" VIEWS FINAL OFFENSIVE

An article by the North Vietnamese military commentator "Chien Thang" (Victor), in the 2 May issue of the army newspaper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, provided a detailed post-mortem of the communist military triumph in South Vietnam and stated that the victory resulted from planning that began soon after the signing of the January 1973 Paris agreement.* His highly laudatory article, entitled "The Marvelous Development of the General Offensive," was studded with encomiums for those who conducted the overall strategy of the campaign and went to great lengths to trumpet the correctness of the battlefield decisions.

Chien Thang summarily dismissed any suggestion that the communist victory was some kind of fluke, rather he attributed it to "struggle" and a "sound line over the past decades." In response to his own rhetorical question of why the "general offensive and uprising" was such a "marvelous success," he emphatically asserted, "the great victory recently won by our people was neither quick nor

* Articles attributed to Chien Thang--a pseudonym associated in the past, among other things, with some of Hanoi's most outspoken arguments for the 1972 communist offensive--have been infrequent since the signing of the Paris agreement in January 1973. For his last previous article, see the TRENDS of 12 December 1973, pages S 1-S 5.

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fortuitous; rather it was the result of a protracted, difficult and valiant struggle. . . ." According to Chien Thang, the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from South Vietnam made the "collapse" of the ARVN a "real possibility" that the communists were quick to exploit. The U.S. policy requiring Saigon to do what the United States itself could not do was, Chien Thang declared, "tantamount to asking the Saigon army to do the impossible."

Chien Thang's boastful analysis of what he dubbed "the most brilliant and probably one of the most extraordinary offensives . . . in the history of war" stated that the choice of Ban Me Thuot as the springboard for opening the offensive represented a "model in the art of selecting the direction for the offensive in a campaign and in making firm and correct decisions." According to his contention, Ban Me Thuot was selected over the other highland cities of Duc Lap, Kontum, or Pleiku because of its "key strategic position." If Ban Me Thuot fell, the remainder of the Central Highlands would become isolated, he declared. The decision on the Ban Me Thuot attack was apparently made after the capture of Phuoc Long Province in early January. Thus, Chien Thang claimed that the "correct decisions" in the campaign were made on the basis of the "latest factors emerging from events on the battlefield and in the United States and from fresh developments such as the Phuoc Long battle."

It is apparent even from Chien Thang's self-congratulatory account of the campaign that the swiftness of events after Ban Me Thuot fell caught Hanoi's military strategists off guard. For example, the capture of Danang was characterized as the result of "fully exploiting a favorable opportunity, taking determined and flexible action and choosing daring methods of attack consistent with the fast-changing situation." In an aside possibly directed to military planners who might have exhibited some reluctance to press the attack, Chien Thang delivered a brief lecture on the importance of the leadership being "sharp and alert" to seizing opportunities during fastbreaking wartime situations. To drive home his point, Chien Thang warned that "indecisiveness and hesitancy at such crossroads of history would . . . not only fail to secure certain victory but also cause an opportunity to be missed and thereby hold back the march of history." Chien Thang made it clear that the opportunity was not missed, however, and credited the "southern armed forces and people" with a "daring and timely decision" that resulted in the fall of Danang and sealed the fate of the Saigon regime. The taking of Danang, he said, brought a "sense of desperation" to the ARVN that marked a "point of no return."

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Although other Hanoi press comment has directly credited the VWP with providing the leadership through the years which brought the war in the South to its successful conclusion, Chien Thang made no mention of the party. In reviewing the roots of the current victory, he attributed a guiding role to "the southern revolution." According to Chien Thang:

The victory of the general offensive could not have come about if, following the coming into force of the Paris agreement on Vietnam, the southern revolution had not correctly assessed the enemy's schemes and had failed to map out a correct path for its continued development . . . or intensively made all-round preparations for the general offensive years in advance--from the construction of roads, the planning of logistics and supply, the building of forces, and the organization of powerful armies to the combat support tasks.

That preparations for an all-out military campaign were being considered by Hanoi shortly after the signing of the Paris agreement was evident in North Vietnamese media as early as June 1973. In that month, the DRV's leading military propaganda organ, the monthly journal TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, began publishing a series of articles reviewing the results of the 1972 offensive to lay the groundwork for improving the communist military forces and operations.*

* For a discussion of the TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN articles, see the TRENDS of 7 November 1973, page 14.

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PEKING APPLAUDS COMMUNIST VICTORY, SHOWS RESTRAINT ON U.S.

Peking's reaction to the communist victory in South Vietnam has closely paralleled the exuberant Chinese response to the Cambodian insurgents' takeover in Phnom Penh earlier in April.* Authoritative Chinese comment praised the tenacity of the Vietnamese "people's war," with stress on the "South Vietnamese" role and only passing acknowledgment of the North's participation, voiced full support for the goal of unifying Vietnam and pledged Peking's continued solidarity, treated the United States with relative restraint, and routinely criticized Soviet expansionist aims.

Peking hailed South Vietnam's "liberation" in a 1 May congratulatory message from Mao Tse-tung, NPC Chairman Chu Teh and Premier Chou En-lai sent jointly to corresponding PRG and DRV leaders, in a 1 May PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, and at a "grand rally" in Peking on 2 May. Protocol formalities for presentation of the Chinese leaders' message to PRG and DRV envoys in Peking followed the pattern for a similar message to Prince Sihanouk on the Cambodian "liberation" on 18 April. The Peking rally for Vietnam drew a PRC leadership turnout similar to the earlier Cambodian fete, including attendance by ten full and three alternate CCP Politburo members and the same keynote speaker, CCP Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying. While there were no known regional celebrations in China for the Cambodian victory, the Vietnam "liberation" evoked small rallies in Chinese provincial capitals most closely linked geographically to Vietnam--Kunming, Canton, and Nanning.

Peking hailed the events in South Vietnam as "an impressive song of victory of people's war," and claimed that U.S. power was "swamped in the vast ocean" of popular resistance and suffered "thorough defeat." Rally speaker Yeh Chien-ying ascribed to the Vietnam victory greater significance than the Cambodian liberation, calling the former one of "tremendous international importance and far-reaching historic significance" when he had described the latter more simply as one of "major international significance." Hanoi's role in the Vietnam victory was noted only in single passing references in the editorial and Yeh's speech to the DRV's "powerful backing," while the Chinese repeatedly lauded the South Vietnamese people's perseverance in protracted armed struggle and use of "revolutionary dual tactics" at the Paris negotiations.

* Peking's response to the Phnom Penh takeover is discussed in the TRENDS of 23 April 1975, pages 5-7.

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Yeh Chien-ying's pledge to the Vietnamese that Peking would continue to perform its "internationalist duty" and that "no force on earth" could destroy the "profound militant friendship" of the two countries was echoed by the PRG charge d'affaires in his speech at the 2 May Peking rally. While the PRG charge offered effusive praise for the China's support and assistance as a motive force in the communist victory, the DRV envoy's speech made passing mention of aid from "socialist countries" without naming them. He stressed the Vietnam Workers Party and the DRV as the main factors behind the communist successes.

The PRC leaders' message to the Vietnamese leaders closed with a wish of success to the "South Vietnamese people" in carrying out their "national and democratic revolution," adding that a "new" and "unified" Vietnam "will certainly come into being," an expression also employed in Yeh Chien-ying's rally speech and the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial.

PEKING TREATMENT
OF U.S., USSR

China's desire to avoid ruffling Sino-U.S. relations was reflected in the omission from the current PRC leaders' message to PRG and DRV leaders of an earlier reference--in a similar message marking the January 1973 Paris agreement on Vietnam--that had recalled Chinese support and aid to Vietnam during the "war against U.S. aggression." Moreover, a 30 April NCNA report on the final U.S. evacuation of Saigon played up comment by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger calling for an end to recrimination over the Indochina failure, the emergence of a newly unified United States that will carefully select but scrupulously maintain commitments abroad, as well as Kissinger's remarks on U.S. consultations with Asian states to establish a revised U.S. Asian policy suited to present circumstances. The report was in line with other recent NCNA coverage of U.S. opinion--including NCNA's treatment of U.S. comment on President Ford's 10 April 1975 foreign policy address*--which has focused on calls for an end to internal divisiveness over Indochina and a gradual realignment of U.S. commitments away from such secondary areas to places of more vital U.S. concern vis-a-vis the USSR, such as Europe and the Middle East.

* Peking's treatment of the President's address is discussed in the TRENDS of 16 April 1975, pages 5-6.

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Peking's comment did not go as far in criticism of the Soviet Union as it had during celebrations marking the Cambodian success, but the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial warned against the superpower "which carries the signboard of 'socialism'" and "burns with ambition and engages in frantic expansion." While not explicitly criticizing Soviet Indochina policy and past involvement there, the editorial seemed to be warning both the United States and the USSR that the "new situation" created by the Indochinese peoples' recent victories left no room for future involvement by either. A passage criticizing both "superpowers," and particularly that "revealing its ugly features of social-imperialism" concluded by declaring "Indochina belongs to the Indochinese peoples and not to the reactionaries, still less to the imperialists."

MOSCOW SEES IMPROVED PROSPECTS FOR DETENTE WITH WAR'S END

Moscow has issued no authoritative statement on the fall of the Saigon regime beyond remarks contained in congratulatory Soviet messages to South Vietnamese NFLSV and PRG leaders and to DRV leader Le Duan, on 1 May. Initial Soviet comment interpreted the communist victory as a vindication of the theses that nations fighting for freedom cannot be conquered and that imperialism cannot reverse historical trends, and as a demonstration of the effectiveness of Soviet support. Direct criticism of the U.S. role has been muted, with at least two commentators stressing in positive tones that the end of the war created conditions for an improved international atmosphere and better U.S.-Soviet relations. A veiled warning to the Vietnamese about Chinese policy toward Vietnam, contained in a Brezhnev message to Vietnam Workers Party First Secretary Le Duan on 1 May, had been preceded by earlier Moscow suggestions that Peking was less than enthusiastic about the collapse of the U.S.-supported Saigon regime.

SOVIET MESSAGES TO
NFLSV/PRG, DRV LEADERS

A 1 May congratulatory telegram from Brezhnev, Podgorny and Kosygin to NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho and PRG President Huynh Tan Phat

saluted the "acknowledged leadership" of the NFLSV and PRG while portraying the communist victory as "further proof of the strength and might" of the support of the socialist countries and progressive forces. Although promising continued support for "the South Vietnamese patriots and the Vietnamese people," the Soviet message did not explicitly mention postwar reconstruction aid (TASS on 5 May reported the arrival in Danang of a Soviet ship carrying food and a Soviet tanker with diesel fuel). The Soviet leaders made no direct reference to the United States but did refer to the Saigon "puppet" regime. Nor did the message specifically mention the reunification of Vietnam, although it did wish the NFLSV, the PRG and the South Vietnamese people success "on the path of implementing their national aspirations."

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Brezhnev's message to Le Duan, carried by Hanoi media, was explicit in describing the communist victory in the South as "an important step" in the "advance toward peaceful national reunification--an undertaking to which thousands of beloved children of your magnificent fatherland have devoted their lives." Brezhnev thrice referred to "imperialist aggression" in his message, but only once did he qualify it as "U.S." aggression. He warned that the Vietnamese people would have to overcome "numerous difficulties" in rebuilding the war-damaged country and eliminating the resistance of "internal reactionaries" remaining in the South. In what appeared to be a veiled reference to the Chinese, he exhorted the Vietnamese to "remain vigilant against actions by external forces hostile to the Vietnamese people's national interests."

TREATMENT OF CHINA,
UNITED STATES

Prior to Brezhnev's implicit warning about the Chinese, an article by Andrey Krushinskiy in the 27 April PRAVDA called attention to "Peking's extremely cool reaction to the course of events in South Vietnam" as the Saigon regime was nearing its collapse. Krushinskiy cited a London DAILY TELEGRAPH report quoting a CCP spokesman as declaring that "the U.S. empire in East Asia is collapsing so quickly that this has almost become a source of complications." This position of the Chinese "is not unexpected," according to PRAVDA, which claimed that in January, when the Saigon government had lost the provincial capital of Phuoc Binh, Chou En-lai argued at a meeting with the deputy foreign minister of Thailand that the U.S. military presence on Thai soil should be maintained.

Moscow comment on the U.S. role was quite restrained, typified by TASS commentators Kornilov and Trushin, both of whom pictured Americans "soberly reflecting" that foreign interference cannot save oppressive regimes. Moscow radio's Kim Gerasimov, in a 2 May commentary, saw the end of hostilities in South Vietnam creating conditions for an overall improvement in the international atmosphere and hoped that this would have a beneficial effect in other parts of the world where there is danger of military conflict.

In an English-language commentary broadcast to North America on 5 May, Vladimir Afonin was even more sanguine about prospects for improved U.S.-Soviet relations. He said there were "no grounds whatsoever" for Western press "concoctions" about a possible worsening of Soviet-American relations because of events in Indochina. "The opposite is more likely," Afonin asserted, adding that the end of the war "should have a beneficial effect on these relations, should strengthen the mutual trust of our peoples." Afonin especially pointed up the common

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responsibility of the United States and the Soviet Union for halting the arms race and preventing nuclear warfare, and concluded that the Soviet Union "keeps on stressing that we are devoting the most serious attention to promoting further our cooperation with the United States."

TASS had earlier noted Secretary Kissinger's reply in his 29 April press conference to a question about the influence of events in Southeast Asia on U.S.-Soviet detente, reporting that Kissinger had said that despite ideological differences there was a practical basis for cooperation, particularly in preventing nuclear war.

In briefly reporting Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's 1 May Pentagon press conference, TASS said that the Secretary's statement indicated that "despite the latest events in South Vietnam, the Pentagon intends to consolidate its hold in other parts of Asia," and noted Schlesinger's references to commitments to South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Israel.

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CAMBODIA

PHNOM PENH DESCRIBES CLASS STRUCTURE, SETS NEW POLICIES

Phnom Penh radio editorials and commentaries in the wake of the 25-27 April "special national congress" of Cambodia have begun to evaluate Cambodian society in Marxist terms, a line which was avoided during the period of insurgency.*

Phnom Penh comment has for the first time defined "the people" along class lines and has repeatedly stressed that the Cambodian "revolutionary organization," presumably referring to the Khmer Communist Party, represents the controlling force in the new administration. Phnom Penh comment has defined the "people" as "poor workers and farmers, lower-middle class farmers and other classes of workers"--allegedly comprising 95 percent of the Cambodian population--and asserted that the "people" have control over the "revolutionary administrative power" under the guidance of "our revolutionary organization." The remaining five percent of the population which joined with the front to defeat the previous government, including the middle class, intellectuals, and "patriotic high-ranking personalities," are said to be satisfied with the plans for a new egalitarian society.

No authoritative Cambodian leader has yet echoed the new stress on class status; Prince Sihanouk and Prime Minister Penh Nouth have remained in Peking for the funeral of Sihanouk's mother. Phnom Penh radio is now the only known media channel of the new Cambodian regime since its press agency AKI announced on 5 May that its transmissions would be "temporarily" suspended the next day. Late last month, following the fall of Phnom Penh, the Voice of the NUFC ceased broadcasting.**

* The "special national congress" is discussed in the TRENDS of 30 April, pages 5-7.

** Confusion caused by the transfer of propaganda outlets may account for no statement being issued on the 5 May fifth anniversary of the founding of the RGNU. Last year the Voice of the NUFC broadcast an editorial and AKI carried an article on the date.

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In discussing the process of rebuilding Cambodia, Phnom Penh comment has returned independence and self-reliance and reaffirmed the tough line against outside interference that was evident at the April congress. Thus, a 5 May commentary reiterated that the new government "absolutely will not allow any country to establish military bases in Cambodia," will remain "irrevocably opposed to all forms of foreign interference in Cambodia's internal affairs," and is "struggling resolutely against all forms of subversion and aggression against our Cambodia." A 1 May commentary warned that the Cambodian people must not relax in the wake of their military victory but must be mobilized to tackle the "main, urgent revolutionary task" of increasing agricultural production, especially rice production, and to expand irrigation systems. The comment has offered only pro-forma thanks to unnamed "friendly countries" for their past support against the United States, while boasting that the Cambodian people defeated this "most powerful imperialism" mainly "with their bare hands."

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MIDDLE EAST

MSCOW GAINS PLO ASSENT ON PALESTINIAN ROLE AT GENEVA TALKS

An apparent concession to Moscow by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) on the issue of formal PLO endorsement of Palestinian participation in the Geneva Middle East conference appears in the joint Soviet-PLO communique marking the end of the 28 April-5 May visit to the USSR by a PLO delegation headed by Yasser 'Arafat. While the PLO endorsement was the most significant result of the 'Arafat visit, there were also indications during the PLO leader's stay that Soviet-PLO differences persist on substantive issues.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE The communique was broadcast by Moscow's Arabic service and published in PRAVDA on the 5th. The key statement conveying PLO assent to a Palestinian role at Geneva notes that "the importance of the participation of representatives of the Arab people of Palestine, on an equal footing with other interested parties, in the efforts to reach a Middle East settlement, including the Geneva peace conference on the Middle East, was emphasized."* In contrast, the communique on 'Arafat's last visit to Moscow on 25-30 November 1974 had explicitly attributed to the Soviet side an endorsement of the Geneva conference and Palestinian participation in it.**

* PRAVDA's use of the passive voice, "was emphasized" (была подчеркнута), fuzzes somewhat the explicitness of the PLO endorsement, but inclusion of both sides is clearly conveyed in the context of the whole paragraph--which begins, "The sides noted . . ."--and by the logic of the paragraph progression. The immediately preceding paragraph had specified broad topics on which "the Soviet side affirmed" its position and the next previous paragraph topics on which "'Arafat informed the Soviet side.' A brief TASS English report on the communique began the sentence in question "they stressed . . ."

** For a discussion of the November 1974 visit and background on Moscow's continued practice since January 1974 of varying its references to general Palestinian and specific PLO representation at Geneva, see the TRENDS of 4 December 1974, pages 5-8.

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The PLO has long refused to go on record endorsing Palestinian participation in a renewed Geneva conference--an issue that involves difficult questions of intra-PLO unity and Arab-PLO coordination on the nature of the participation, as well as Israeli-PLO relations. PLO spokesmen have generally attempted to skirt the issue by asserting that there can be no PLO response without an appropriate invitation and that even then, a Palestinian national congress, such as met in June 1974, would have to be convened to reach a final decision. On occasion, some PLO officials have also emphasized that the independence of a PLO delegation would be one prerequisite for its participation in the Geneva talks--a precondition Israel has consistently rejected and on which Moscow has avoided commitment. The wording of the 5 May Soviet-PLO communique would seem to afford Moscow and the PLO ample room to maneuver, however, particularly since it avoids the difficult problems of the delegation's composition, its degree of independence, the timing of its participation, and its acceptance at the talks by the United States and Israel.

The 5 May communique is also notable for a passage conveying apparent PLO acceptance of the notion that any new Arab-Israeli bilateral agreements be concluded as part of a comprehensive Mideast settlement. The communique suggests this by stating that the sides noted the importance of Arab and PLO unity "against any kind of bilateral separate deals divorced from an overall settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict." The concept, though not the phrasing, distinctly echoes the new formulation Moscow recently adopted to refer to possible new "partial measures," first introduced in a Soviet-Egyptian communique on 22 April 1975 and repeated in a Soviet-Syrian communique on 26 April 1975: "Any partial measures or decisions on them must be an integral part of the overall settlement and must be decided on and implemented within the framework of the Geneva Middle East peace conference."

The PLO delegation's Moscow visit is the latest in a recent series of visits there by high-level Arab officials and follows those by Iraq's Revolution Command Council Deputy Chairman Saddam Husayn (14-15 April), Egypt's Foreign Minister Fahmi (19-22 April), and Syria's Foreign Minister Khaddam (23-25 April). Soviet media comment, typified by a Moscow radio commentary in Arabic on the 5th, has presented these visits as an effort to promote coordination of Soviet-Arab positions on how to resolve the Palestinian issue and achieve a final Mideast settlement. Egypt and Syria, in their recent joint communiqes with Moscow, reaffirmed their support for

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PLO participation in the Geneva conference and agreed that any new "partial measures" must occur within the Geneva framework. With 'Arafat's apparent endorsement of the same key elements, Moscow can view--or at least depict--its recent round of Soviet-Arab meetings as productive preparations toward eventual resumption of the Geneva conference.

SOVIET-PLO DISCORD Some aspects of 'Arafat's visit, however, suggested that Soviet-PLO relations continue to be marked by disagreement on certain substantive issues and that the apparent PLO concessions on the Geneva conference reflected in the 5 May communique may have been difficult to extract.

+ The persistence of internal PLO disunity, long a Soviet concern, was strikingly evident on the day of the PLO delegation's departure for Moscow. Cairo's MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY, citing Palestinian sources, had reported on 24-25 April that the PLO delegation would include Zuhayr Muhsin, head of the PLO military department and leader of the Syrian-backed fedayeen group, as-Sa'iqah. A Cairo Voice of Palestine broadcast on the 28th reported Muhsin's arrival with the delegation in Moscow. But Muhsin did not in fact make the trip. Beirut's DAILY STAR on 4 May reported that Muhsin the previous day had said he decided not to go to Moscow because the delegation had "no specific mission" and "no important issue to discuss," adding that his relations with 'Arafat were "somewhat troubled, but not to the extent of a total break."

+ Muhsin, in his comments reported by the DAILY STAR on the 4th, sharply criticized Moscow for a "new blunder" in recently offering Soviet participation in "strictest guarantees" of Israel's security under an appropriate Mideast settlement entailing Israel's withdrawal from Arab territories--an offer made by Foreign Minister Gromyko on 23 April in a dinner speech addressed to visiting Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam.* Asserting that Muhsin's statements "reflect Syrian government thinking," the paper noted that his remarks were the first public PLO repudiation of the Soviet offer.

+ Indication of Soviet-PLO disagreement over issues involved in resumption of the Geneva conference was suggested by an unexpected three-day extension of 'Arafat's visit on 1 May, when TASS announced that the delegation had gone to Baku, Azerbaijan. Prior to this break in the visit, difficulties in the talks had been hinted at in

* For details and background on this issue, see the TRENDS of 30 April 1975, pp. 14-21.

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TASS and Moscow radio reports on the 'Arafat-Gromyko meeting on the 29th, referring to the importance of participation in "efforts" to achieve a Mideast settlement but not mentioning Geneva in that context.

+ Unlike the November 1974 visit, 'Arafat did not meet with Kosygin. Nor, apparently, did he obtain a long-sought audience with Brezhnev, although a Cairo Voice of Palestine broadcast on 1 May claimed that following the May Day parade in Red Square, 'Arafat was "received" by Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders. The claim was not repeated, however, and Soviet media made no mention of any Brezhnev-'Arafat contact.

+ Moscow still has not accorded the PLO official high-level recognition as "sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinians, Soviet commentators, however, have continued the practice evident in recent months of occasionally using that title. A Timoshkin radio commentary on the 29 April, for instance, stressed the importance of Palestinian participation in the Geneva conference, adding that "it is known that the PLO is the lawful and sole representative of the Arab people of Palestine."

+ Unlike the previous visit, no mention was made of the status of the PLO mission or "representation" in Moscow, which the USSR had first acknowledged in a 3 August 1974 Soviet-PLO communique. The November 1974 communique noted that "appropriate practical measures" had been undertaken to open the mission "in the very near future."

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EUROPEAN CP CONFERENCE

AXEN GUARDEDLY OPTIMISTIC ON PREPARATIONS, MAVERICKS RESERVED

In the most authoritative progress report to date on the proposed all-European communist party conference, Politburo member and secretary Hermann Axen of the host SED, in a 2 May interview, gave a cautiously optimistic appraisal of the current state of preparations for the conference, planned for this year in East Berlin following the summit-level windup of the European Security Conference (CSCE). At the same time Axen denounced Western speculation that the party conference preparations had run into trouble over differences between the pro-Moscow and independently oriented participants. Axen's interview came in the wake of new public indications of resistance by the leading European independents--the Romanian, Yugoslav and Italian communist parties--to any imposition by Moscow of a common ideological line at such a conference, a line that could include explicit or veiled censure of the Chinese.

AXEN INTERVIEW

Axen recalled at the outset of the interview, which was carried by the East Berlin domestic service on the 2d and published in the 3/4 May weekend issue of NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, that the initial February session of the conference working group in East Berlin had instructed the SED to prepare the first draft of the "political document" to be adopted at the final conference. Implying difficulties, he went on to report that the second working group session on 8-10 April, also in East Berlin, had "proceeded altogether very constructively and brought forth many ideas, suggestions, and proposals" regarding the content of the conference document, and that the 20 participating parties had "unanimously agreed to continue the work on the document collectively." With similar caution, he said "it can be rightly stated that" the first two working group meetings took a "positive" course and created conditions for further conference preparations. The atmosphere of the two meetings, he noted, was one of "fraternity and frankness."

Implicitly countering the independent parties' objections to the course of the preparations, Axen insisted that the work of achieving "necessary collective agreement" on the document was marked at the same time by full respect for each party's equality and individual views. In the same vein, he denied there was any intention to use the conference as a vehicle "to lay down the specific task of every party, a task which each party was carrying out independently" in accordance with its respective country's historical and national conditions.

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Axen dismissed as wishful thinking alleged capitalist press speculation that the conference preparations had "been interrupted," attributing such speculation to "the class enemy" and antidetent forces who fear the unity of the European communist parties and the failure of their splitting and undermining efforts.

ROMANIA Bucharest most recently conveyed its reservations regarding the conference document by endorsing the independent-minded views of Spanish CP General Secretary Carrillo through the medium of a favorable account of his recent interview with a Yugoslav paper. In SCINTEIA's account of the interview, from the Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE, Carrillo ruled out in more forceful terms than the Romanians themselves have used the adoption of a "political program" by the projected European CP conference. He called instead for only a "general platform," which could be adopted not only by the communist parties but by "the entire progressive left," a platform fully respecting specific conditions and differences. Sharply distinguishing between the interests of the ruling and nonruling communist parties of Europe, Carrillo reportedly declared that a political program document would be merely an instrument of the policy of the socialist countries and would hamper the struggle for power by the nonruling parties. He added that the adoption of a program document would be inappropriate for the ruling communist parties as well, in view of their "serious differences" both on internal and foreign policy, as members of the Warsaw Pact or "nonaligned." The interview was reported in SCINTEIA during Carrillo's 30 April-5 May visit to Bucharest.

On its own, the Romanian Communist Party had most recently reasserted its stand at a 1 April session of its Executive Political Committee, declaring that the European communist party conference must respect each party's independence and sovereignty and right to establish its own political line. Romania boycotted the 1977 all-European party conference at Karlovy Vary when it felt that conference preparations indicated insufficient respect for party independence.

YUGOSLAVIA Yugoslavia's reservations have been reiterated authoritatively by its second ranking figure, LCY Executive Committee Secretary Stane Dolanc, in an interview with DELO and VJESNIK U SRIJEDU carried by TANJUG on 26 April. Reasserting the principle of consensus--insisted on by both the Yugoslavs and the Romanians at the conference preparatory sessions--Dolanc said the conference document must contain "only those issues on which agreement by all parties is reached," as opposed to a document adopted by majority vote which propounded Moscow's ideological line. The

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document, he added, must not spell out "obligatory joint actions" by the European communist parties. Implying an intent by the LCY to continue to participate in the conference preparations, Dolanc said his party would contribute "in the future" to the preparations in accordance with its own viewpoints.

ITALIAN CP The Italian Communist Party has similarly reiterated in the recent period its view that the European CP conference should embody independence and diversity, as well as a loose working unity wof communist and noncommunist forces. Thus General Secretary Berlinguer, in greeting a 19 April Rome meeting on European economic cooperation attended by the 28 communist parties scheduled to participate in the European CP conference, called for an "independent active contribution" by each European country--members of blocs as well as neutral and nonaligned--to the cause of cooperation on the continent. Observing that "only communists" were attending the Rome meeting, Berlinguer called for a broadened dialog with other political forces with the aim of achieving "a broad unity of all democratic forces." While noting, according to TASS' report, that the Rome meeting was held within the framework of preparations for the European CP conference, the Italian CP leader apparently avoided the controversial issue of the conference document.

In his 18 March main report to the 14th congress of the PCI, Berlinguer had made only a passing reference to the planned all-European CP conference, making it clear that his party's interests were more closely tied to the West European communist movement as exemplified by the Brussels conference last year. While alluding briefly to the PCI's active promotion of the all-European conclave, he stressed at the same time that "the Western European workers movement can and must accomplish an even more significant task" for the worldwide workers movement.

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

SOVIET BORDER ENVOY DEPARTS AMID SIGNS OF CONTINUED IMPASSE

Peking and Moscow comment surrounding the 5 May departure of the chief Soviet negotiator at the Peking border negotiations, Deputy Foreign Minister L.F. Illichev, suggests that there have been no breakthroughs in the talks. Moscow radio followed past practice in reporting that the envoy departed Peking on the 5th "temporarily on official business." Peking continued its usual practice of not mentioning the Soviet negotiator's travels to and from China, but NCNA did note on 29 April that Illichev and other members of the Soviet delegation to the border talks had been escorted on a tour of southern Chinese cities on 17-28 April. The agency failed to characterize the atmosphere during the tour; similar tours taken by other foreign diplomats in China have been described as "warm" and "friendly."

Illichev had arrived in Peking for the latest round of talks on 12 February amid an unusual barrage of highly authoritative Chinese and Soviet comment defending their respective positions on the border issue and calling on the other to make the first move toward accommodation. For instance, Premier Chou En-lai's 13 January 1975 report to the PRC National People's Congress included a diatribe against Soviet intransigence on the border issue which called on Moscow to "do something" to solve "a bit" of the problem. A 22 February PRAVDA editorial article had firmly rejoined that it was the PRC leadership who "should finally take really constructive steps" to help improve relations.*

More recent comment by both sides indicates that no constructive steps have been made. An 18 April PRAVDA editorial discussing the resolution on foreign affairs adopted at the 16 April CPSU Central Committee plenum asserted bluntly that "there have been no changes recently in relations between the USSR and China," adding a standard denunciation of the Maoist leadership for following an anti-Soviet foreign policy. And, Soviet Politburo Candidate Ustinov, speaking at a 6 May celebration in Ulaanbaatar marking the 30th anniversary of the defeat of Germany, denounced Peking's foreign policy and indicated that Moscow sees the Peking

* Chou's speech is discussed in the TRENDS of 22 January 1975, pages 11-14, and the PRAVDA article in the TRENDS of 26 February 1975, pages 1-3.

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leadership as firmly opposed to improved bilateral relations. He characterized "the policy of the Chinese leadership itself" as the "sole obstacle" to normal relations. Such comment is notably harder than authoritative Soviet assessments on China following the last previous Soviet party plenum which issued a resolution on foreign affairs, in April 1973. A leading article in PRAVDA on 29 April 1973 that was pegged to the plenum had restricted discussion on China to a routine critique of PRC foreign policy and had avoided all reference to the existing state of Sino-Soviet relations.

Peking has reverted to its usual silence on the border issue in the wake of Chou's complaint at the NPC, but concurrent Chinese comment has sustained a heavy attack against a broad range of Soviet internal and foreign policies. Most recently, a signed 5 May PEOPLE'S DAILY article offered Peking's first comment on the recent CPSU Central Committee plenum, claiming that Moscow's "shameless hypocrisy" in calling for military detente at the plenum had been amply exposed by the recent Soviet "mammoth worldwide naval exercises."

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V-E DAY

ATTEMPTS TO BOOST BREZHNEV APPARENT IN ANNIVERSARY ARTICLES

Among the issues apparently raised by the extraordinary public fanfare the Soviet government has whipped up to celebrate the 30th anniversary of V-E Day is whether Brezhnev should or should not profit politically from the event. He has apparently been promoted to full army general, judging from Marshal Grechko's reference to him as such in a Moscow ceremony on 17 April. Beyond this, Brezhnev has gained some publicity as a wartime hero, but this publicity has been largely confined thus far to the local and specialized press, not the mass circulation media. In the meantime, the main beneficiaries of the campaign are likely to be the military and possibly Stalin, since they symbolize the sentiments of patriotism and pride being celebrated on the anniversary.

HONORS FOR BREZHNEV

Grechko's reference to Brezhnev as "general of the army" clearly implies that he has been promoted from his last known rank of lieutenant general, although there has been no public confirmation of the promotion and no other leader has referred to Brezhnev in those terms. This suggests that there may be opposition in the leadership to Brezhnev's promotion and that Grechko's action was intended either to force the issue or simply to demonstrate his own or the army's loyalty.

In the meantime, there have been favorable references to Brezhnev's wartime role in Azerbaydzhhan, where Brezhnev was stationed during part of his wartime service and in one of the specialized central newspapers. The Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY on 26 April carried a big feature on the hero city of Novorossiysk which included three articles mentioning Brezhnev's activities during the war. Brezhnev was also favorably mentioned in a review of recent movies about Soviet hero cities carried in SOVIET CULTURE on 29 April.

Apart from these specific personal honors, Brezhnev's detente policy has enjoyed some spin-off benefits from the war anniversary articles. The theme that the wartime collaboration between the Soviet Union and the Western powers provided a model that remains relevant to the present day has been reiterated innumerable times in anniversary comment. One variant in

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particular that would seem to carry far-reaching implications if taken at face value is the assertion that the wartime experience confirmed the possibility of effective "political and military cooperation" between states with different social systems. This was stated at least twice, once by Grechko in his main address to the Moscow war anniversary conference on 18 April, and again by General Shtemenko in a press conference reported by TASS on 24 April.

VASILEVSKIY By far the most substantial and historically significant comment on the war was an interview ON STALIN with the wartime Chief of the General Staff Marshal Vasilevskiy carried in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on 30 April. Although his remarks are chiefly important for their historical significance, they are likely to be read also as a reflection of current official views on Stalin's status in history.* Vasilevskiy's portrait is a balanced one, but clearly slanted toward a favorable assessment of Stalin's personality and achievements. This can perhaps be taken as a consensus view among Stalin's military subordinates during the war, one clearly shared by Zhukov, as his book, Reminiscences and Reflections, testifies. The endorsement of this view in the party youth newspaper by Vasilevskiy, who enjoys one of the most respected military reputations in the Soviet Union, cannot help but impress it on the public consciousness.

* For discussion of earlier treatment of Stalin in connection with the V-E Day anniversary, see the TRENDS of 9 April 1975, pages 12-14.

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USSR

MAZUROV, GRISHIN, KULAKOV RANKED HIGH AT MAY DAY PARADE

The lineup of Soviet leaders at Moscow's 1975 May Day parade reinforces evidence that Mazurov, Grishin and Kulakov are now the ranking junior members of the Politburo: that is, they are next in line after the five elders--Brezhnev, Podgornyy, Kosygin, Suslov and Kirilenko, whose relative status has long been firmly established. Brezhnev had set the official order by listing the Politburo members hierarchically at the close of the 24th CPSU Congress in 1971, but the Politburo membership was substantially altered by the April 1973 CPSU plenum, which dropped Shelest and Voronov and added Andropov, Grechko and Gromyko, leaving the new order in doubt. The new pecking order is revealed by examination of the post-April 1973 lineups of leaders on the tribune in Red Square on May Day and 7 November, lineups which are becoming increasingly consistent.

Leaving aside the five senior members, and three junior members who are never included in the lineups (Grechko, who stands with the military; Shcherbitskiy, who attends the Kiev parade; and Kunayev, who attends the Alma-Ata parade), the following pattern emerges for the remaining eight Politburo members: Mazurov now ranks steadily highest; Grishin and Kulakov have recently risen to preferred status; Pelshe and Polyanskiy have fallen. Andropov and the recently removed Shelepin have steadily been ranked at the bottom, although on other occasions when Grechko, Shcherbitskiy and Kunayev are included in seating or standing arrangements at Supreme Soviet sessions or other ceremonies, the latter three also rank at the bottom. These rankings are clearly not based on length of membership, as two of the top-ranked, Grishin and Kulakov, entered the Politburo only in 1971, long after Polyanskiy, Pelshe and Shelepin.

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Following are the Red Square May Day and October Revolution anniversary lineups for junior Politburo members beginning in May 1973:

May 1973	Nov. 1973	May 1974	Nov. 1974	May 1975
6. Pelshe	Mazurov	Mazurov	Mazurov	Mazurov
7. Mazurov	Pelshe	(no Pelshe)	Grishin	Grishin
8. Polyanskiy	Gromyko	Kulakov	(no Kulakov)	Kulakov
9. Grishin	(no Grishin)	Polyanskiy	Polyanskiy	Polyanskiy
10. Shelepin	Kulakov	Grishin	Gromyko	Gromyko
11. Kulakov	Polyanskiy	Gromyko	Pelshe	Pelshe
12. Gromyko	Shelepin	Shelepin	Shelepin	(Shelepin dropped)
13. Andropov	Andropov	Andropov	Andropov	Andropov

The patterns of seating in boxes during Supreme Soviet sessions and at other ceremonies often differ from this order, but this does not appear to be significant, since seating arrangements on such occasions do not appear to be quite as formalized as parade review lineups.

RANKING BY PORTRAITS The status of Politburo members is also reflected in another form of hierarchical display practiced in some provincial capitals--the lineup of portraits of the leaders above the reviewing stands of the local May Day parades. However, the Ukraine is the only republic that consistently carries clear photos of these lineups in its press. Its May Day lineup, as pictured in the 2 May RADYANSKA UKRAINA, also gives precedence to Mazurov, Grishin and Kulakov, except that native son Shcherbitskiy is ranked above them. Kiev deviates radically from the Moscow lineup in placing Polyanskiy at the bottom, however, an indication of his apparent unpopularity among Ukrainian leaders. In contrast to the fluctuations in Moscow lineups, the Kiev portrait lineups have been maintained in exactly the same order at all May Day and November 7 parades since the April 1973 changes in the Politburo.

Kiev Portraits

6. Shcherbitskiy
7. Mazurov
8. Grishin
9. Kulakov
10. Pelshe
11. Andropov
12. Kunayev
13. Gromyko
14. Grechko
15. Polyanskiy

Moscow May Day 1975 Photo

6. Mazurov
7. Grishin
8. Kulakov
9. Polyanskiy
10. Gromyko
11. Pelshe
12. Andropov

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KAZAKH LEADERS OUSTED IN CONNECTION WITH CONSTRUCTION LAG

A 24-25 April Kazakh Central Committee plenum ousted the officials in charge of the republic's industry and agriculture after hearing a sharp attack by First Secretary Kunayev on shortcomings in construction. Both the republic Central Committee secretary for industry, A.S. Kolebayev, and the republic first deputy premier for industry, A.M. Vartanyan, as well as the Central Committee secretary for agriculture, M.B. Iksanov, were removed from the republic leadership. In addition to underlining the seriousness of the Kazakh construction lag, their ouster may reflect Kunayev's desire to introduce new blood into the republic leadership as new Supreme Soviet elections and the holding of a new Kazakh party congress approach. All three ousted officials, however, were apparently Kunayev's own proteges.

Kunayev in his 24 April report declared that there were serious errors in the republic's construction industry and that a session of "harsh self-critical analysis" had become necessary. He dwelt on construction problems in the metallurgical and chemical industries and assailed mismanagement of construction by a number of ministers, including those in agricultural fields as well as industrial branches. When the plenum concluded the following day, industry secretary Kolebayev was removed to "go on pension," agriculture secretary Iksanov was removed "in connection with his election as first secretary of the Ural obkom," and Vartanyan, who had been replaced as first deputy premier on 11 April, was dropped from the republic Central Committee bureau to take up unspecified "other work." Although these officials were not directly criticized, their ouster from the republic bureau and retirement or demotion to less important positions clearly indicated that they were being blamed for the shortcomings.

Kunayev himself had been responsible for the careers of all three: Kolebayev had been raised from first secretary of a small oblast to republic industry secretary in April 1965, shortly after Kunayev became republic first secretary; Vartanyan from the minor post of chief of the main administration for the chemical industry of the Kazakh Sovnarkhoz to republic first deputy premier in February 1966; and Iksanov from Dzhambul oblast first secretary to agriculture secretary in February 1971, when Kunayev was further strengthening his control over the republic.

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The new republic secretary for agriculture is a livestock specialist and former first secretary of Ural oblast named Sh.K. Konpanov. Konpanov has not risen rapidly in the Kazakh hierarchy, but he has apparently been well connected. He was one of only three Kazakh obkom first secretaries elected full members of the CPSU Central Committee in 1966 and one of only four so elected at the 1971 CPSU Congress--this despite the fact that his oblast has one of the smallest party organizations in Kazakhstan. The ousted agriculture secretary, Iksanov, traded places with Konpanov, replacing him as first secretary of Ural oblast.

Two relatively obscure Russian officials were named to the vacant industrial posts, Aleksandr Gavrilovich Korkin as Central Committee secretary and Sergey Artemovich Smirnov as first deputy premier. Korkin was formerly director of the Kazakh metallurgical construction trust, and became Kazakh minister for construction of heavy industrial enterprises only three years ago, in February 1972. Smirnov is especially obscure, having only been identified as director of an unnamed combine in Tselinograd in 1971 and as a member of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet's construction commission and an "engineering-technical worker" in the mid-1960's.

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LAW OF THE SEA

PEKING ASSERTIVE, MOSCOW DEFENSIVE ON LOS CONFERENCE

The Third UN Conference on the Law of the SEA (LOS), currently in its second substantive session in Geneva, has been used by Peking as a vehicle for promoting its image as a true friend and defender of the developing countries against the "threat" from the "superpowers' rapacious campaign of maritime hegemony."* Having neither a large navy nor extensive deepsea fishing operations, China has espoused the LOS stands of the developing coastal states--extended territorial limits, strict coastal-state control of adjacent straits and economic zones, and the creation of a powerful international organization for exploitation of the deep seabed.

Moscow, forced on the defensive by the PRC's apparently greater support for developing countries, has had to walk a tightrope in criticizing China's LOS views for fear of offending the generally unnamed Third World proponents of "unrealistic" positions who are supported by Peking. Soviet propagandists have thus focused on accusing China of engaging in "disruptive" tactics and encouraging "arbitrary and unilateral acts" which, as INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS noted in June 1974, "clash with the vital interests of the developing countries" because they threaten to undermine the principles of international law on which all states depend. For its own part, Moscow at the LOS conference has proposed a 12-mile territorial limit but accepted

* The growing importance of the sea as a source of minerals and food and the proliferation of countries since the inconclusive end of the second LOS conference in 1960 were the basic reasons for convening a third UN conference in 1974 in an effort to write an omnibus treaty covering all major LOS issues, including territorial limits, economic zones and fishing rights, passage through straits, exploitation of the deep seabed, and pollution. Recent Soviet and Chinese LOS statements are briefly discussed in the TRENDS of 20 February 1975, pages 15-16.

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the idea of a loosely defined 200-mile economic zone, conditioning support for the economic zone on the achievement of an overall LOS treaty which would include, as a ring gun non, endorsement of the concept of free passage through straits connecting international waters.

STRAITS PASSAGE Although Soviet and Chinese propagandists have exploited a variety of themes in the 20 June-29 August 1974 session in Caracas and in the current Geneva session, greatest emphasis recently has been on questions of straits usage and economic issues rather than on extended territorial claims, possibly because something approaching a consensus on a 12-mile territorial limit was achieved at Caracas. The sensitive issue of straits which fall within territorial waters but connect international bodies of water has been systematically exploited by Peking, which has condemned the "superpowers' untenable theory of 'free passage'"--the right of ships and planes to pass without coastal state permission.* Noting on 27 March that the Chinese delegation in Geneva had held that a strait within territorial limits constituted "an inseparable component part of the territorial sea of a coastal state," NCNA has energetically supported the doctrine of "innocent passage," which requires submarines to surface and military ships and planes to receive littoral state permission before passing through such straits. In supporting Third World proposals that "any activities not directly related to passage" be forbidden in straits, NCNA has scored Moscow's "arrogant attempt" to "impose" its own straits proposals on the conference.

The Soviet Union, most of whose shipping passes through straits touching the Black Sea, Baltic Sea or Sea of Japan, has insisted on freedom of navigation for both military and merchant ships, PRAVDA arguing on 31 August 1974 that "free passage for all ships through international straits" must become "a most important integral part of a new international code on the law of the sea." N. Belov, in a ZA RUBEZHOM article signed to press on 20 March, defended free passage as a principle which "is now recognized and has proved its worth

* The extension of territorial limits to 12, rather than 3 miles would enclose some 100 straits within the overlapping territorial waters of one or more states, and thus makes rules governing passage of vital consequence to major maritime nations such as the United States and USSR.

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over a long historical period." Belov noted that such straits as Malacca and Gibraltar, which would be closed with the extension of littoral states' territorial limits to 12 miles, are "key sectors of international seaways" and that any restrictions on their use would be "an infringement of the interests of all other states." The writer said that the Soviet draft proposals on free passage made adequate provision for the protection of coastal states from pollution and other dangers and that further controls would "contradict the interests of the development of international relations." In an effort to make its straits stand palatable, especially to the Arab states, the Soviet Union has been careful to stress that free passage should apply only to straits connecting two bodies of international water and not, for example, to the Strait of Tiran which lies between the Red Sea and the territorially enclosed Gulf of Aqaba. In a long article outlining Soviet LOS positions, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in February 1975 emphasized that the Soviet proposal "specifically stipulates" that "the principle of innocent passage for all ships" should apply in straits such as Tiran and others "which connect the high seas with territorial waters."

ECONOMIC ISSUES Moscow has been careful to tie the straits issue to Soviet support for the 200-mile economic zone, NEW TIMES noting on 21 March that all sections of the proposed treaty were part of a "closely interlinked package" which could not be "taken apart." Regarding the economic zone, Moscow has recognized the coastal state's "sovereign rights" and first call on food and mineral resources, but Moscow radio also noted on 26 August 1974 that foreign states should be allowed to fish "on the basis of paying reasonable prices." Pointing to Soviet consideration of the interests of littoral states in such matters as fishing as proof of the fairness of Moscow's LOS proposals, IZVESTIYA on 21 August 1974 rapped Peking's attempt to "make illusory political capital among the Third World countries" by attacking the Soviet program.

Supporting a broader definition of coastal-state control of the economic zone, NCNA on 26 April quoted the Chinese representative in Geneva as saying that the state must have "exclusive jurisdiction" over the entire economic zone and should enjoy "full sovereignty to protect, regulate, use, explore and exploit" resources in the zone. The Chinese and Third World representatives were reported as having successfully refuted the Soviet Union's "absurd theory" that the economic zone was part of the high seas and that littoral countries should consider "other

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"legitimate uses" of the area in exercising their rights. NCNA warned that any limitation of a state's exclusive rights would "pave the way for large fishing fleets of the two superpowers" which would plunder the coastal region. Such language is typical of NCNA, which continually accuses the "superpowers" of poaching in other nations' waters. Thus, on 4 April Ecuador was praised for having captured U.S. vessels which "sneaked into its territorial waters for stealthy fishing," and it was reported that Soviet trawlers had "nearly drained the Finnish traditional fishing zone of all fishes."

Moscow and Washington have also been criticized by Peking for "plunder" in the deep seabed as well. The two countries advocate an international seabed organization with authority largely limited to licensing--rather than undertaking--the exploitation of the seabed, while Peking has supported a "comprehensive authority" which would itself engage in seabed activities. NCNA argued on 28 March that the U.S. and USSR proposals would create an organization which "would inevitably become a show-piece" while the "superpowers and their monopoly companies will exercise real power, turning the international seabed into a field for their private interests."

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KOREA

DPRK MEDIA NOTE CONTINUED U.S. COMMITMENT TO SOUTH

Recent North Korean media comment has suggested that U.S. resolve to maintain its presence in South Korea has been strengthened, rather than weakened, by recent developments in Indochina. A NODONG SINMUN commentary on 2 May, for example, complained that although the United States has been defeated in Indochina, it is not "drawing a proper lesson" and instead is making an effort to "back up at any cost" the Pak Chong-hui government. DPRK media have also continued to highlight a standard Pyongyang theme--that the United States wants to hold on to South Korea forever as a base for "aggression" in Asia.

A 13 April NODONG SINMUN commentary on President Ford's 10 April foreign policy speech focused on the idea that the United States was pledging to reinforce its commitment to the ROK and tighten its alliance with Japan. Commenting on Defense Secretary Schlesinger's 1 May press conference, a 3 May NODONG SINMUN commentary emphasized U.S. resolve to honor its military commitments and reinforce its position in South Korea as part of a post-Vietnam strategy.

Only two monitored DPRK commentaries in recent weeks have questioned either the willingness or capability of the United States to honor its commitments to its allies, and neither suggested that the time was now propitious to challenge directly the U.S. presence in the South. A 25 April Pyongyang radio commentary on the lessons of Indochina, broadcast while Kim Il-song was in Peking, claimed that domestic opposition to U.S. foreign policy had intensified, and the U.S. economic crisis had grown to such an extent that the United States was in no position to help its "puppets," and that it would be unable to save the regime in Seoul. A 6 May NODONG SINMUN commentary directly questioned the efficacy of U.S. commitments when it claimed that the fate of the Lon Nol and Thieu governments, "believing in 'the commitments' and 'assistance' of U.S. imperialist masters," show that "the day has gone when the South Korean puppets could benefit from the help of the U.S. imperialist masters."

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JAPAN

PEKING, MOSCOW APPLY PRESSURE ON TREATY "HEGEMONY" ISSUE

Sino-Japanese peace treaty negotiations remain stalled on the question of including an "anti-hegemony" provision in the agreement, a provision that was contained in the 1972 Sino-Japanese joint communique establishing diplomatic relations between Peking and Tokyo. The Chinese side has warned that dropping the clause now would be a step backward from the 1972 communique. Moscow comment has continued to object to the provision, claiming it is aimed at the Soviet Union, but recent articles in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA have not repeated earlier Soviet warnings of the consequences for Japan if it accepted the Chinese lead on the issue.

CHINA China-Japanese Friendship Association President Liao Cheng-chih became the first PRC leader to comment publicly on the treaty issue, in a Peking banquet speech for members of a pro-Peking delegation of the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) on 3 May, two days prior to the arrival of an official JSP delegation. Liao avoided direct mention of the hegemony issue in a treaty context, but he clearly indicated the PRC position in stating that "we advocate advancing, not retreating, from the basis of the joint statement." Liao pledged "joint efforts with our friends in the Socialist Party" to have the treaty concluded at an "early date," and NCNA quoted a Japanese speaker at the banquet as saying the JSP delegation had reached "unanimity of opinion" with the Chinese in opposing superpower hegemonism.

At a banquet on the 5th for the official delegation led by JSP Chairman Narita, Liao reiterated as "unswerving" the Chinese demand to "move forward" on the basis of the joint statement. Liao did not repeat his pledge to work with the JSP in concluding the treaty, nor did he express any urgency over signing the treaty. According to the NCNA report on the speech, Liao condemned Soviet "big-power hegemonism" and noted that the Chinese were "willing to join all other people in the world in opposing the hegemonism of the superpowers," a pointed reminder of the PRC position to the JSP delegation, which represents a party divided on how to handle the anti-Soviet "hegemony" issue.

Peking's emphasis on adhering to the joint statement's wording of the hegemony clause was strongly underscored in NCNA reports on the treaty debate in Japan. A 3 May NCNA item noted that a Japanese Diet member had called the clause an "integral entity,"

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and that its two ideas (opposition to hegemony by Japan and China and by any other country or group of countries) are "inseparable." The same item cited another Japanese speaker as saying that a treaty without the anti-hegemony clause would be "not only a retreat from, but also a violation of the joint statement," and that efforts now to oppose the treaty were, in fact, efforts to "strangle" the joint statement and undermine Japan-China friendship.

MOSCOW Articles on 25 April in PRAVDA by the paper's Tokyo correspondent, and in IZVESTIYA by Asian commentator V. Kudryavstev were the first exclusively devoted to the treaty question by either Soviet paper. Both articles portrayed the Japanese, especially the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, as cautious in their approach to the treaty, in contrast to their earlier "hastiness" in advocating the treaty's ratification. Elements in the Japanese opposition camp, however, were criticized for adhering to Peking's stand.*

PRAVDA singled out Chairman Takeiri of the Komei Party as displaying "particular zeal" in this regard. IZVESTIYA named no names but pointed to "certain politicians of pro-Maoist inclinations who call themselves 'socialists' or champions of a 'just policy.'" Soviet radio commentaries broadcast to Japan on 4 and 5 May on the Narita delegation confidently predicted the JSP would not succumb to Chinese pressure to accept the PRC position on the anti-hegemony clause. Emphasizing the differences between Chinese and JSP policies on "unarmed neutrality" and the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, the commentary on the 5th voiced Soviet support for the JSP's policy for the "peaceful and democratic development of Japan," and noted a CPSU-JSP communique calling for cooperation between the two parties.

* This treatment of the LDP contrasts with that in a 27 February PRAVDA article, also by the paper's Tokyo correspondent, which complained that "certain" Japanese politicians' attempts at "balancing" between Moscow and Peking by exploiting the Sino-Soviet rift indicated that "prejudice, myopia, and an opportunistic approach" to Japanese-Soviet issues "still persist in certain Japanese political circles."

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While PRAVDA quoted a Japanese newspaper as saying that a hegemony clause would be a "serious turnabout" in Japanese policy which might be regarded as the conclusion of a "military alliance," Moscow has not made this charge in its own name. A Moscow radio commentary on 30 April did accuse Peking of "plotting to create a Sino-Japanese military alliance against the USSR."

Neither the PRAVDA nor IZVESTIYA articles repeated earlier Moscow warnings about the consequences for Japan of drawing closer to China. An article in a March issue, No. 10, of the Soviet weekly NEW TIMES had warned Japan that by establishing closer relations with China on a "platform which affects the interests of other countries," it would be "partly to blame" for any "adverse consequences" of Peking's stand on a variety of issues ranging from detente to international economic cooperation. NEW TIMES also warned that promotion of Japanese-Chinese relations "in any way detrimental to Soviet interests may be taken into account by the Soviet Union in its relations with Japan."

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NOTES

PRC MAY DAY: In keeping with the low-key pattern for Chinese holiday observances followed since Lin Piao's purge, this year there was no central editorial issued greeting May Day, and neither Mao nor the ailing Chou En-lai appeared for the celebrations. Most active, Peking-based leaders, headed by Vice Chairman Wang Hung-wen, made the now traditional strolls through Peking parks. Chiang Ching, however, failed to appear on the occasion for the first time since the cultural revolution. NCNA's 1 May report on the holiday carefully noted that all provincially-based Politburo members appeared in their own bailiwicks. In noting foreign guests at the festivities, the NCNA report made an unusually explicit public acknowledgement of China's need for foreign technical aid, referring to the presence of "foreign experts who are helping China with her socialist construction." PEOPLE'S DAILY and other central newspapers greeted the holiday by frontpaging a large picture of Mao and printing several Mao quotations used to guide the current campaign on studying the dictatorship of the proletariat.

MOSCOW ON MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: During the current spring recess in the Vienna force reduction negotiations, Moscow and its Warsaw Pact allies have continued emphatically to blame the NATO side for the lack of progress in the talks. In statements by official spokesmen as well as in commentary, Moscow and its Warsaw Pact allies have contrasted their own alleged flexibility, as reflected in their new proposals, with the purported inflexibility of the Western participants, who fail to respond to these Pact initiatives or even advance beyond the original NATO proposal of November 1973. Thus head of the Soviet delegation Oleg Khlestov, in a TASS interview after the last Vienna plenary session on 17 April, bluntly declared that the Western delegations "have not tabled a single new proposal" and continued to insist on their reduction scheme "aimed at getting unilateral military advantage." PRAVDA's Vienna correspondent I. Melnikov in an article on the 29th typified much of the comment in pointing out that when the talks resume on 15 May the Western negotiators "also will have to demonstrate good will and realism" to match that already demonstrated by the socialist states if the talks are to break out of the current impasse. However, despite this apparent indication that Moscow intends to mark time in Vienna, Khlestov in his TASS

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interview and Pact press spokesman Strulak in Vienna on the 17th have not totally discounted the worth of the 18 months of negotiations. Warsaw's Strulak noted that with continued efforts the talks will bear fruit and Khlestov said that the exchange of views has "not been useless" and added that the examination of views will set the foundations for future agreements.

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 28 APRIL-4 MAY 1975

<u>Moscow (2360 items)</u>		<u>Peking (919 items)</u>			
May Day	(--)	18%	Vietnam	(4%)	23%
[Party/Government	(--)	8%]	["Liberation" of	(--)	16%]
Greetings			South Vietnam		
V-E Day 30th Anniversary	(9%)	12%	Cambodia	(15%)	10%
"Liberation" of South Vietnam	(--)	8%	May Day	(--)	7%
China	(3%)	4%	Korean President Kim	(16%)	6%
Chilean CP leader	(--)	3%	Il-song in PRC		
Corvalan Awarded			[Joint Communique	(--)	4%
Lenin Peace Prize			PRC Government State-	(--)	4%
PLO Leader Arafat in USSR	(--)	3%	ment on Sikkim Annex-		
			ation		
			Malayan CP 45th Anniversary	(--)	4%
			Japan	(1%)	3%